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The Function of Corporate Tax-Residence in 
Territorial Systems  
Omri Marian* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the U.S. “worldwide” (or “residence-based”) tax 
system, corporations that are considered “domestic” for tax 
purposes are generally taxed on their worldwide income from 
whatever source derived.1 Foreign corporations are taxed in the 
United States only to the extent they earn income that is sourced 
within the United States. The U.S. residence-based system is 
frequently contrasted with “territorial” (or “source-based”) 
systems, variants of which are adopted by most member 
countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).2 In a territorial system, income is only 
taxed if it is derived from sources within the geographical 
boundaries of a jurisdiction. This is generally true whether the 
income is earned by foreign or domestic taxpayers. 
Foreign-source income (meaning, income sourced outside the 
jurisdiction’s geographical boundaries) is generally exempt from 
tax. 
In a previous article, I outlined a functional approach to 
corporate tax-residence determination in residence-based 
systems.3 This Essay complements that article by explaining the 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am 
thankful to Reuven Avi-Yonah, Susie Morse, and participants at the Chapman Law 
Review Symposium on “Business Tax Reform: Emerging Issues in the Taxation of U.S. 
Entities” for their helpful comments.  
 1 This rule is of course subject to multiple exceptions that enable U.S. domestic 
corporations to avoid current taxation on most foreign-sourced income. See, e.g., Edward 
D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 700 (2011) (describing the United 
Sates residence-based system as an “ersatz variant on territorial systems”); J. Clifton 
Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 
79 (2009) (surveying the U.S. exception to residence-based taxation, concluding it does not 
function as a residence-based system). The starting point of the analysis, however, is that 
U.S. corporations’ worldwide income is subject to corporate tax in the United States.  
 2 See Omri Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in 
the United States, 32 VA. TAX REV. 133, 163–65 (2012) [hereinafter Marian, Meaningless 
Comparisons].  
 3 Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2013) 
[hereinafter Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations].  
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functional importance of corporate tax-residence determination 
in territorial systems. I differentiate between “positive” and 
“negative” functionalities of corporate tax-residence in territorial 
systems. Under a positive approach, corporate tax-residence 
positively points to the source of income earned by the 
corporation. Thus, corporate taxes serve as a proxy to source 
taxation. While the positive function had historical merit, it is 
currently obsolete.4 
Under a negative approach, corporate tax-residence is only 
relevant to the extent it prevents income from being sourced to a 
jurisdiction in which income could not have possibly been 
generated. As such, residence determination serves as an 
instrument to prevent income shifting and base erosion. I suggest 
that this is the correct role of residence determination in the 
current environment.5  
More specifically, multinational corporations use multiple 
“income shifting” techniques to erode the tax base in jurisdictions 
in which income has economically been generated. Such 
techniques are aimed at manipulating the source of income for 
tax purposes by having income that has been generated in a 
high-tax jurisdiction reported as earned in a low-tax jurisdiction. 
Income shifting techniques necessitate the use of affiliate 
corporations resident in different jurisdictions. At least one of 
these corporations must be a tax resident in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, so income can be booked (i.e., shifted) to that foreign 
affiliate. Such foreign affiliates usually perform little or no real 
economic activity. Therefore, I suggest that residence 
determination in territorial systems should be constructed so as 
to make sure that such foreign affiliates are not respected as tax 
residents of jurisdictions where no real activity takes place.  
The issue of residence determination in territorial systems is 
a timely one in the United States. In recent years, the idea to 
replace the U.S. residence-based system with a territorial one 
gained substantial traction. One recent example is a 
comprehensive tax reform draft suggested by David Camp, the 
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means. Camp’s 
proposal adopts the territorial variant known as a “participation 
exemption” system.6 Under a participation exemption system, 
 
 4 See discussion infra Part II.C.  
 5 See discussion infra Part III. 
 6 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014 
DISCUSSION DRAFT SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY tit. IV, available at http://waysand 
means.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_and_means_section_by_section_summary_final_022
614.pdf.  
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dividends paid by foreign subsidies of U.S. corporations, as well 
as capital gains from the disposition of foreign subsidiaries, and 
other foreign operations will be largely exempt from U.S. tax. A 
similar recent proposal has been brought forward by Michael 
Enzi, a member of the Senate Finance Committee.7 
One common theme of these recent territorial-reform 
proposals is their complete ignorance of the issue of corporate 
tax-residence. While the reason for such ignorance is not explicit, 
it is possibly based on the assumption that in territorial 
systems—in which the question of jurisdiction is a question of 
source rather than residence—residence determination is 
meaningless.8 This is wrong. The reason is that in many 
instances the source of income is keyed off the residence of a 
corporation. Income from dividends and interest payments is 
sourced to the residence of the paying corporation.9 Capital gains 
from the sale of a corporate subsidiary’s stock are sourced to the 
residence of the corporate seller.10 There are other examples 
where source of income is directly linked to the residence of the 
taxpayer.11 These source rules play an important role in 
intercompany payments that stand in the basis of income 
shifting techniques. Questions of source and residence are not 
really separate jurisdictional questions. Residence is used to 
manipulate source, and as such can be designed to prevent such 
manipulation. 
Currently, the United States uses a formal test for corporate 
residence determination—the place of incorporation (POI). This 
test is notoriously easy to manipulate. All that one has to do in 
order to create a “foreign” affiliate in a tax haven is to 
incorporate one. Leaving this test intact under a territorial 
system may exacerbate the problem of income shifting.  
 
 7 United States Job Creation and International Tax Reform Act of  2012, S. 2091, 
112th Cong. tit. I (2012).  
 8 See Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, supra note 3, at 1630. 
 9 See Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. 
REV. 259, 281 (2003) (“The basic rule sources the interest income to the country of the 
payor . . . . Most countries consider the residence of the payor as the country of source.” 
And “[a] powerful consensus also exists with respect to the source rules for dividends. 
They are sourced at the country of the dividends’ payor, which allows the source country 
to get the ‘first bite’ of taxation.”). 
 10 HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 539 (3d ed. 2010) (“[M]ost countries generally accept the 
international treaty norm that capital gains on shares are taxable only in the residence 
country of the shareholder.”). 
 11 For some additional examples in the U.S. context, see I.R.C. §§ 861–863 (2012) 
(source depends on residence in the context of guarantee fees, communications income, 
certain sales through fixed place of business, and more).  
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This Essay continues as follows: In Part I, I explain the 
functional approach to corporate tax-residence determination. In 
short, the functional approach requires that tax-residence models 
will be constructed so as to support the policy purpose for which 
corporations are taxed in the first place. In territorial systems, 
any corporate-tax construct (including residence) can only make 
sense if it operates to assure that income produced in a specific 
jurisdiction is taxed in that jurisdiction. In Part II, I explore the 
possible functionalities of residence determination in supporting 
territorial taxation, using the United States as a case study. 
Historically, tax-residence positively functioned as a proxy to the 
source of income. Today, however, such function can no longer 
stand. In Part III, I discuss an alternative instrumentality of 
residence determination in territorial systems. Residence can 
have a negative functionality, namely it can point to jurisdictions 
that are clearly not the source of income. As such, residence 
determination functions as an anti-income-shifting mechanism. 
One way to achieve such a function is to adopt tax-residence 
determination that is based on formulary apportionment that 
takes into account a corporation’s contribution to the control 
group earnings (though there are other tests that may achieve 
similar results). I conclude with a call to consider 
corporate-residence determination in U.S. territorial reform 
proposals. 
I. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO CORPORATE TAX-RESIDENCE 
A.  The Functional Approach in Residence-Based Systems 
Corporate tax-residence, namely, the determination whether 
a corporation is “domestic” or “foreign” for tax purposes, is a 
foundational legal construct. The tax-residence heavily affects 
the tax liability of the corporation and its affiliates. 
Unfortunately, corporate tax-residence is meaningless as a 
normative construct. The reason is that corporations are not real 
beings; they are imaginary entities. Corporations are not, in and 
of themselves, the target of policy making.12 Rather, corporations 
are instruments. Corporations are used by their individual 
interest holders (such as shareholders, creditors, managers, and 
employees) to achieve certain goals. In turn, corporations are 
 
 12 Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax Electivity of 
U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 395 (2011) (“After all, corporations are not 
sentient beings, and cannot feel benefits or burdens. Thus, they are not directly of 
normative interest.”). 
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targeted by policy makers to affect individuals who are involved 
with corporations. 
Taxation of corporate entities is not different. Corporate 
taxes are one of the most common forms of taxation around the 
world. But it is not the corporations that are burdened by such 
tax. Individuals are.13 For example, shareholders may see a 
diminished net return on their investment as a result of the tax 
imposed at the corporate level. Alternatively, employees may 
bear the burden through decreased wages. Or, it may be the case 
that consumers are affected if corporate taxes are capitalized into 
the pricing of the corporate products and services.14 
Given that corporations are nothing more than an 
instrumentality, I have suggested in a previous article that 
corporate tax-residence determination must also be instrumental 
to the policy of corporate taxation.15 Namely, in formulating a 
model for corporate tax-residence determination, we must work 
through two steps. First, define the policy purposes for which we 
tax corporations. Specifically, we must identify the group (or 
groups) of individuals whom we wish to burden by taxing 
corporations. The second step is to adopt the tax-residence test 
that best supports the policy purpose we identified. A corporate 
tax-residence test (as well as any corporate-tax construct, in fact) 
is only successful if it assures that corporate taxes eventually 
burden the intended individuals. 
In residence-based systems, such as the United States, the 
underlying assumption is that there is a group or groups of 
individuals, the income of whom we wish to tax on a worldwide 
basis. Corporate tax is just an instrument to reach at the pockets 
of these individuals. Depending on who these individuals are, we 
may adopt different tax-residence tests.16 For example, if those 
individuals are shareholders, we may choose to determine the 
residence of corporations based on where the majority of 
shareholders reside. If we aim to burden the managers of 
corporations (in their capacity as managers), we might choose to 
 
 13 The question of who those individuals are is unresolved and subject to a lively 
academic debate. See Marian, Meaningless Comparisons, supra note 2, at 161–62. 
 14 See WILLIAM M. GENTRY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
OTA PAPER 101, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE 
INCOME TAX 1 (2007) (“[C]orporate tax could be borne by some combination of the 
shareholders of corporations, investors in all capital through a decrease in the overall 
return to capital, workers through a decrease in wages, and customers through increased 
output prices.”). 
 15 Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, supra note 3. 
 16 For a discussion of possible groups of individuals who may be the normative 
targets of corporate tax policy, see id. at 1638–49.  
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subject corporations to tax in the jurisdiction in which the 
corporate headquarters is located.  
B. The Functional Approach in Territorial Systems 
The assumption that corporate taxation is an instrument to 
tax the worldwide income of certain individuals cannot stand in 
territorial systems of taxation. The reason is that in territorial 
systems, a policy choice has already been made to only tax 
income sourced within the jurisdiction, regardless of the 
residency of the taxpayers earning such income. In our quest to 
determine the “correct” corporate-residence in territorial 
systems, we therefore must start with a positive assumption that 
territorial taxation is superior, as a policy matter, to worldwide 
taxation.17 
Under a functional approach to territorial taxation, we could 
justify the taxation of corporate entities only to the extent it 
supports source-based taxation. Namely, that taxing a corporate 
entity somehow assures that income is subject to tax in the 
jurisdiction in which it has been created. This should be true 
regardless of the identity of the individuals involved with the 
corporation. This concludes the first step of the functional 
analysis of corporate tax-residence determination in territorial 
systems. In the next two parts, I address the second part of the 
analysis. Meaning, how different models of corporate 
tax-residence may functionally support source-based taxation.  
II. THE “POSITIVE FUNCTION” OF CORPORATE TAX-RESIDENCE  
A. Corporate-Residence as a Proxy for Source  
The first obvious possible territorial instrumentality of 
corporate tax-residence is that residence of a corporation 
positively identifies the source of income. Under this approach, 
income earned by a corporation that is a tax-resident in 
jurisdiction X is assumed to be sourced in jurisdiction X. 
Similarly, payments made by a corporation resident in 
jurisdiction X (for example, dividend or interest payments) are 
assumed to be sourced in jurisdiction X. I refer to this function as 
the “positive function” of corporate tax-residence. 
 
 17 This is probably one of the most contested issues in international tax literature, 
and beyond the scope of this Essay; I assume that for whatever reason, policy makers 
have reached a conclusion that a territorial system of taxation is preferable. For a 
summary of arguments in the debate on territorial versus worldwide systems (as well as 
other tax methods), see JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34115, REFORM OF 
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: ALTERNATIVES 1 (2012).  
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The positive approach is very much apparent in the current 
system of international taxation. For example, practically all 
countries in the world source interest and dividend payments to 
the country of residence of the paying corporation.18 The 
philosophical underpinning for this rule is that the payments 
should be sourced to the place where the economic activity 
supporting the payment is taking place.19 Since it is the economic 
activity of the corporation that supports that payment, income 
should be sourced to the residence of the corporation. For this 
justification to make sense, however, we must add one additional 
logical link: we must assume that the economic activity of a 
corporation indeed takes place where the corporation resides for 
tax purposes.  
Historically, this assumption seems to have had some 
traction. In 1923, the League of Nations commissioned a group of 
economists to study the taxation of cross-border transactions.20 
The resulting report proved to be an influential tax policy 
document.21 The report explicitly linked residence of business 
entities and the source of income earned by such entities. For 
example, the report referred to the “seat and residence” of a 
business as one of the four elements of “economic allegiance,” 
which in turn is one of the possible bases upon which the 
imposition of tax may be justified.22 The report acknowledged, 
however, the complexity associated with such an assumption. 
When discussing the source of dividends, for example, the report 
considered the “fact that the company may produce its goods in 
one State and sell them in another, or have its chief office in one 
State and yet secure most of its earnings from sales in other 
States.”23 This may result in “multiplicity of the claims of origin” 
of the dividends.  
Today, the positive view is sometimes used to explain the 
allocation of taxing jurisdictions on international income in the 
context of bilateral income tax treaties. Such treaties are 
 
 18 See generally Brauner, supra note 9; AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 10 and 
accompanying text.  
 19 See, e.g., Richard Vann, International Aspects of Income Tax, in TAX LAW DESIGN 
AND DRAFTING II 718, 722 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996). 
 20 Fin. Comm. Econ. & Fin. Comm’n, Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations 
Doc. E.F.S. 73 F. 19 (1923), available at http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/pubotbin/tocc 
er-new?id=brulegi.sgml&images=acdp/gifs&data=/usr/ot&tag=law&part=1&division=div1 
[hereinafter Report on Double Taxation].  
 21 It is argued that a coherent international tax regime exists and that its principals 
have been developed by the 1923 document. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of 
International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996). 
 22 See Report on Double Taxation, supra note 20. 
 23 Id. 
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instruments that determine how income from cross-border 
transactions is allocated between the two signatory countries. 
Most treaties are based on a model published by the OECD. 
Professor Richard Vann concludes that under the OECD model, 
corporate tax functions as a “source tax” for business activities.24 
As Vann explains, tax treaties regularly provide that business 
income earned in a contracting state through a “permanent 
establishment” of a foreign taxpayer is taxed at source (i.e., the 
jurisdiction where the foreign taxpayer’s permanent 
establishment is located).25 Permanent establishment is usually a 
fixed place of business, which is not legally separate (for 
example, by way of incorporation) from the controlling foreign 
taxpayer.26 Business income earned not through a permanent 
establishment is generally exempt from source taxation. 
However, foreign taxpayers may operate in the country of 
source not through permanent establishments, but rather 
through controlled subsidiaries that are respected as separate 
from their owners. Generally, holding the stock of a corporation 
does not give rise to a permanent establishment of a shareholder 
in the subsidiary’s jurisdiction. However, under the tax treaty 
network, such domestic subsidiaries are generally subject to tax 
jurisdiction in their country of residence. Thus, the taxation of 
domestic subsidiaries controlled by a foreign taxpayer “is in 
policy terms a source tax” on income of the controlling foreign 
taxpayer.27 This equates the treatment of income earned by a 
foreign taxpayer operating through a permanent establishment 
with income earned through a subsidiary.  
B. The Historical Success of the Positive Function in the United 
States  
I now turn to the question of whether the positive approach 
has any merit in the context of international tax reform in the 
United States. The approach made historical sense. Namely, 
when the corporate tax-residence test was first formulated, it 
was reasonable to assume that the residence of a U.S. 
corporation positively pointed to the source of income earned by 
the corporation. 
 
 24 Richard Vann, “Liable to Tax” and Company Residence Under Tax Treaties, in 
RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EC LAW 197, 199 (Gugliemo Maisto 
ed., 2009) [hereinafter RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES]. 
 25 OECD, COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON 
CAPITAL Art. 7 (2010), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/ 
oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-oncapital-2010_9789264175181-en. 
 26 Id. Art. 5. 
 27 Vann, supra note 24, at 199–200. 
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Early U.S. corporate tax laws were justified as an 
instrument targeting either managers or shareholders. Such 
policy considerations were largely devoid, however, of 
international considerations. It was not until the third decade of 
the twentieth century that the U.S. worldwide, residence-based 
approach to international tax began to take shape.28 However, as 
I explain below, late nineteenth to early twentieth century U.S. 
corporate taxes functionally operated as a source-based 
mechanism, and the residence test adopted back then made 
functional sense. That was the case whether the policy aim was 
shareholders or managers.  
1. Why Did the United States Start to Tax Corporations? 
The reasons for which Congress originally enacted corporate 
income tax laws are disputed. According to one reasoning, the 
first attempt by Congress to adopt a general tax on corporate 
profits—in the Tariff Act of 189429—was influenced by real entity 
theory of the corporation prevalent at that time.30 Real entity 
view of the corporation would theoretically support the taxation 
of corporations separately from their shareholders. As a 
historical explanation, however, entity theory is largely rejected 
by modern scholars,31 with one commentator going as far as to 
note that “advances in the theory of corporate personality appear 
to have had only a modest influence, if any, on the taxation of the 
corporation.”32  
Currently, accounts explaining the emergence of corporate 
taxation in the United States generally follow one of two main 
 
 28 Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1026 n.23 (1997) (referring to 1918–1928 as 
the “formative period” of U.S. international taxation); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece 
Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313, 317 
(“The formative period of the U.S. international tax regime . . . was . . . the period between 
the two World Wars.”). 
 29 The 1894 Act imposed a 2% tax on the net income of all “corporations, companies, 
or associations doing business for profits in the United States.” Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 
349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. The Act was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 
(1895).  
 30 See GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
PROJECT, TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: REPORTERS’ STUDY 36–40 (1999) 
(arguing for a connection between the development of real entity theories of corporations 
and taxation of corporations as separate entities). 
 31 Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1209 (2004) (explaining the reasons for which 
real-entity view of corporate tax is “unpersuasive”); Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as 
Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 466 (2001) 
[hereinafter Bank, Entity Theory as Myth].  
 32 Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 31. 
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paths. According to one theory, corporate taxes as a real entity 
measure were first enacted in 1909, primarily as a regulatory 
device.33 The tax reflected negative sentiment in Congress 
towards large-scale business entities34 that accumulated 
substantial power towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
Influential corporate managers were identified as a source of 
abuse of power.35 It has therefore been suggested that “the 
imposition of the corporate tax will enable the government, the 
shareholders and the public to obtain information that will serve 
as the basis for restricting such managerial abuses of power.”36 
Under this approach, the 1909 Act was an attempt to restrict 
managerial power.37  
Under a second theory, “corporate income tax was originally 
adopted as a substitute or ‘proxy’ for taxing corporate 
shareholders directly,”38 and the 1909 Act was simply part of a 
continuous attempt to tax shareholders’ wealth accumulated by 
doing business in corporate form.39 Congress imposed taxes on 
companies in the transportation, banking, and insurance 
industries—all industries dominated by the corporate form of 
doing business—as early as 1864.40 With the proliferation of 
general incorporation laws during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, corporations came to dominate most 
businesses, making the industry-specific approach inadequate.41 
The 1894 Act is seen as the first explicit federal attempt to 
systemically get at shareholders’ wealth through the taxation of 
corporations.42 After the 1894 Act was struck down by the 
 
 33 Reuven Avi-Yonah, Why Was the US Corporate Tax Enacted in 1909?, in 2 
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW 377 (John Tiley ed., 2007) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, 
Why Was the US Corporate Tax Enacted]; Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1217–20; Marjorie 
E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 
IND. L.J. 53 (1990). 
 34 Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S. 
Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 497, 510 
(2010); see also Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 31, at 508–11.  
 35 Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1220 (citing President Taft’s Message to Congress, 44 
CONG. REC. 3344 (1909)). 
 36 Avi-Yonah,Why Was the US Corporate Tax Enacted, supra note 33, at 383.  
 37 Id. at 382–87. 
 38 Bank, Entity Theory as Myth, supra note 31, at 452; see also Steven A. Bank, 
Entity Theory as a Myth in the US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 , in 2 STUDIES IN THE 
HISTORY OF TAX LAW, supra note 33, at 393, 393 [hereinafter Bank, US Corporate Excise 
Tax of 1909].  
 39 Bank, US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, supra note 38, at 395. 
 40 Bank, Entity Theory as a Myth, supra note 31, at 504–05. 
 41 Id. at 505–08 (describing the dramatic increase in doing business through a 
corporate form toward the end of the nineteenth century).  
 42 Id. at 462 (“The simultaneous income taxation of individuals and corporations was 
unprecedented at the federal level . . . .”). 
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Supreme Court,43 Congress reverted back to its industry-specific 
course of action in the War Revenue Act of 1898,44 which imposed 
certain taxes on corporations engaged in the sugar and oil 
businesses. In its original version, the 1898 legislative proposals 
were broad enough to encompass all incorporated entities.45 
Congress ultimately rejected the idea in favor of taxation of two 
specific industries, sugar and oil.46 However, “it was commonly 
understood that the object of the tax was two concerns—the 
Standard Oil Company and the American Sugar Refining 
Company.”47 General taxation of all corporate entities was 
reintroduced in the 1909 Act, which was evidently tailored so as 
to withstand constitutional challenges, again as a mechanism to 
get at shareholders’ wealth.48 
2. Place of Incorporation Test Functioned to Support 
Source-Based Taxation 
Assuming any of the historical justifications for U.S. 
corporate taxation are plausible, did corporate tax-residence 
constructs support such purposes? Tax-residence of corporations 
was first explicitly defined in the War Revenue Act of 1917.49 
Section 200 of the 1917 Act defined a “domestic” corporation to be 
any corporation “created under the law of the United States, or of 
any State, Territory, or District thereof.”50 This definition—using 
the place of incorporation (POI) as the sole determinant of 
corporate tax residency—survives almost unchanged to this 
day.51 Curiously, the definition did not appear in the early 
version of the bill. Congressional records provide no explanation 
for the definition’s sudden appearance in the bill’s conference 
version.52 
 
 43 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 
(1895). 
 44 War Revenue Act of 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448. 
 45 See Bank, US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, supra note 38, at 396–98 (discussing 
the original bill of the 1898 Act). 
 46 The 1898 Act did not clearly define the corporations that were the subject of the 
tax. Rather, it defined the taxpayers subject to the tax by describing the business sectors 
in which they were engaged. Section 27 of the 1898 Act imposed the tax on “every person, 
firm, corporation, or company carrying on or doing the business of refining petroleum, or 
refining sugar.” 30 Stat. at 464. 
 47 Bank, US Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, supra note 38, at 399. 
 48 Id. at 400–01. 
 49 War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 200, 40 Stat. 300, 302. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Under current I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), a domestic corporation is any corporation 
“created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any 
State.” I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2012). 
 52 The definition of “domestic” did not appear in early versions of the bill. See, e.g., 
H.R. REP. NO. 65-45 (1917). The first time the definition appeared in any formal version 
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However, the 1917 Act was merely a semantic change to an 
already functioning jurisdictional concept. Specifically, the same 
jurisdictional concepts had already been clearly established by 
the 1909 Act. Even though the 1909 Act did not explicitly define 
the terms “domestic” or “foreign” corporations, taxing jurisdiction 
applied, much like the 1917 Act, to  
every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for 
profit and having a capital stock represented by shares . . . organized 
under the laws of the United States or of any State or Territory of the 
United States . . . [or] organized under the laws of any foreign country 
and engaged in business in any State or Territory of the United 
States.53  
However, in the case of corporations organized under the laws of 
foreign countries, the tax applied to net income “from business 
transacted and capital invested within the United States.”54 
Once again, the 1909 legislators left very little guidance, and 
certainly no explicit explanation, as to their adoption of the POI 
test.55 One commentator, Rudolf Weber-Fas, expressed 
skepticism that any rationale for adopting the POI test in the 
United States existed at all,56 and speculated that—given the 
minor role of international trade in U.S. economy at that time—
international tax considerations have not been a source of 
“principal legislative concern.”57 Weber-Fas concluded that it is 
likely Congress simply adopted the POI test because it was used 
by many states at the time.58  
Indeed, during the nineteenth century, most states imposed 
various levies and property taxes on corporations “domiciled” or 
“resident” within the state’s territory.59 Thus, Weber-Fas 
implicitly suggests at least one possible explanation for the 
adoption of POI at the federal level: path-dependence. But this 
 
was in the draft submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance on May 25, 1917. See 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 65TH CONG., ACT TO PROVIDE WAR REVENUE (1917). 
Congressional records do not reveal the background for this sudden appearance.  
 53 Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (emphasis added); see also William 
P. McClure & Herman B. Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income from 1909 to 1989: How 
a Tilted Playing Field Developed, 43 TAX NOTES 1379, 1381 (1989).  
 54 § 38, 36 Stat. at 113. 
 55 Rudolf Weber-Fas, Corporate Residence Rules for International Tax 
Jurisdiction: A Study of American and German Law, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 215 
(1968). 
 56 Id. (“The existence of a clear rationale or of a conscious policy behind the adoption 
of [the POI] principle is doubtful . . . .”). 
 57 Id. at 216–17. 
 58 Id. at 216. 
 59 Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 511–17 (describing the adoption of corporate level 
taxes by multiple states during the nineteenth century). 
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path-dependence argument is significant, because at the state 
level, corporate tax-residence determination served as a source 
proxy.  
Specifically, during much of the nineteenth century, states 
enjoyed territorial monopolies on corporate law.60 Incorporation 
was not freely available. Rather, corporate charters were granted 
by special legislative acts of the states.61 Consistent with such 
notion, “it was generally understood that a corporation’s legal 
standing reached only to the borders of the incorporating state” 
and that “a corporation existed only within the borders of the 
sovereign that created it.”62 Consequently, it was accepted that a 
corporation, as a separate entity, “[could not] be taxed except by 
the State which created it,”63 and that states could tax “foreign” 
corporations only on “[t]he privilege of acting” within the taxing 
state’s territory.64 
This view of the corporation worked well with state-level 
corporate taxation during most of the nineteenth century. At the 
time, corporations had limited geographical reach. “Businesses 
transacted primarily in local product, labor, and capital markets, 
and rarely had operations out-of-state.”65 State-level corporate 
taxation had even been justified, among other reasons, on 
administrative grounds, noting the advantage of the state over 
the federal government in taxing locally-operated businesses.66 
It is not only the case the state-chartered businesses were 
locally operated by nature of their business;67 many state laws 
also required it. “Corporations and legislatures expected—and 
legislatures sometimes mandated—that corporations would have 
significant operations in the incorporating state, that officers and 
directors would be residents of that state, and that shareholders’ 
and directors’ meetings would be held in the state.”68 The 
 
 60 Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 33, 46 (2006).  
 61 Id. at 46–47; Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 515. 
 62 Tung, supra note 60, at 54.  
 63 JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., THE LAW OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC § 462, at 619 (1904). 
 64 Id. § 462, at 620. 
 65 Tung, supra note 60, at 46; see also Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise 
of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 107 (1955) 
(noting that until 1880, the U.S. economy was “typified by small single-plant companies 
serving limited markets”).  
 66 Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 516. 
 67 Tung, supra note 60, at 56 (“[F]irms ordinarily incorporated in the state where 
their organizers resided and where their major operations were located.”) (emphasis 
added).  
 68 Id. at 56–57. 
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functional result was a convergence of the place of residency of 
capital-owners, residency of managers, the place of incorporation, 
and the place where the corporation did business. 
Under such a set of circumstances, it was perfectly sensible 
to view the place of residence of a company as the source of 
income earned by the company.69 Consequently, payouts from a 
company of a state could have been assumed to be supported by 
income earned in that state. 
This logic also extended to federal-level corporate taxes. 
Under the historical circumstances surrounding the 
crystallization of federal corporate taxation in the United States, 
the corporations that were the intended targets of corporate tax 
laws were incorporated in the United States and at the same 
time derived most of their income from U.S. sources.  
Specifically, during the late nineteenth century, U.S. 
businesses were overwhelmingly focused on U.S. local markets, 
which provided a “continental size” consumer base for their 
products.70 The economic opportunities of scale could all be 
exploited with no need to look to foreign markets. American 
companies thus tended to invest in their own backyard,71 and the 
 
 69 Interestingly, state-level corporate taxes had territorial effects similar to the ones 
experienced by civil law countries in mainland Europe. In Continental Europe of the 
nineteenth century, foreign companies were generally not recognized, nor allowed, to 
operate within a jurisdiction unless a treaty so provided. By the late nineteenth century, 
most mainland European jurisdictions had laws under which domestic companies were 
legally recognized only if they had their main economic activity within the jurisdiction of 
residence. The purpose of these sets of laws was to prevent shareholders from operating 
in their own jurisdiction through a foreign company, and by doing so, to avoid the reach of 
local corporate law. Similarly, these rules prevented shareholders from operating in a 
foreign jurisdiction through a domestic company, thus avoiding the foreign jurisdiction’s 
corporate law. The result of these incorporation rules was that companies were only 
recognized and allowed to operate in the countries where their real activity took place, 
which later became known as the “real seat” or “central administration” principle. 
Considering the cost and speed of travel and communications at that time, it followed that 
management were placed in the same jurisdiction where operations were conducted. This 
“real seat” test has been carried into tax law, as most continental jurisdictions originally 
determined the tax-residence of corporations based on the “real seat” test. Many still do. 
See John F. Avery Jones, Corporate Residence in Common Law: The Origins and Current 
Issues, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 121, 132–33. 
 70 MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, THE RISE OF MODERN BUSINESS: GREAT BRITAIN, THE 
UNITED STATES, GERMANY, JAPAN & CHINA 87 (3d ed., 2008). 
 71 JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY 
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 164 (2003); LANCE E. DAVIS & ROBERT J. CULL, 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1820–1914, at 
79−91 (1994) (discussing the insignificance of foreign investment by U.S. investors 
between 1797 and 1896).  
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United States only played a minor role in global trade.72 While 
U.S. exports steadily increased during the nineteenth century, 
the United States remained a net-capital importer until the end 
of the century.73 Even amid positive inflow of investment, up 
until the early nineteenth century (when the 1909 Act became 
functional), foreign investment in the United States did not play 
a significant role in U.S. economic growth.74 Thus, it would seem 
plausible to argue that jurisdiction to tax corporations could have 
acted as a functional equivalent of territorial taxation. 
The corporations at issue were for the most part 
state-chartered corporations, which meant that their owners and 
managers were most probably U.S. residents (by virtue of being 
residents in the charter state), and that they operated primarily 
within the United States. Control patterns at the time also 
supported the localized view of the corporations. “As the 19th 
century was drawing to a close, family control of industrial 
enterprises was the norm in the United States and there were 
only very rare examples of companies with widely dispersed 
shareholdings and well-developed managerial hierarchies.”75 
Thus, the assumption of identity between POI, residency of 
managers, residency of shareholders, and the place of activity 
obviously worked for the federal level just as it worked at the 
state level.  
However, during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
an increasing number of states neglected the model of 
state-chartered corporations in favor of general incorporation 
laws.76 Local business entrepreneurs were quick to take 
advantage of the liberalization of corporate laws, and “by 1904 
corporations accounted for three-quarters of the United States’ 
industrial outputs.”77 Between the 1890s and the early 1900s, the 
U.S. economy underwent an unprecedented wave of 
consolidations, resulting in the separation of management from 
 
 72 Robert E. Lipsey, U.S. Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments, 1800-1913, at 
5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4710, 1994), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4710.pdf.   
 73 Id. at 10.  
 74 DAVIS & CULL, supra note 71, at 111. 
 75 Brian R. Cheffins, Investor Sentiment and Antitrust Law as Determinants of 
Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great Merger Wave of 1897 to 1903, at 4 (Dec. 15, 
2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Chapman Law Review), available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2x90s8bc#page-1.  
 76 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 135–37 (1932) (describing the erosion of centralized ownership 
structure parallel to adoption of general corporate laws in multiple states).  
 77 BLACKFORD, supra note 70.  
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control.78 This period saw the institutionalization of managerial 
capitalism, namely the rise of professional, hierarchical salaried 
management at the expense of personal management by 
owners.79 Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
assumption of identity between the place of incorporation, source 
of income, and the residency of shareholders or managers seemed 
not at all obvious. 
Nonetheless, a functional argument for POI had merit even 
under the newly developed socio-economic environment of the 
early twentieth century. The wave of consolidations engulfing the 
United States starting in the 1890s indeed changed the 
ownership structures of U.S. corporations. However, it 
apparently did not change the national identity of the 
corporations’ owners and managers, nor did it change the 
geographical source of the corporations’ income. The 
consolidation movement was horizontal in nature. It was 
characterized by the amalgamation of multiple small and 
medium businesses in the same industry into trusts, and later 
into holding companies.80 Owners of the “old” family businesses 
ceded management rights to some form of central management, 
but did not relinquish their ownership.81 The result was the 
diffusion of ownership, but the centralization of management.82 
Thus, the transformation was from a situation in which many 
U.S. individuals owned and managed many U.S. incorporated 
corporations, to a situation in which many U.S. individuals 
owned or managed few U.S. incorporated corporations that 
earned income in the United States. To the extent that the true 
targets of corporate taxes were those individuals’ income, POI 
still made sense.  
Interestingly, the classes of owners and managers targeted 
by early corporate taxes never remained in the abstract. 
Individuals were, at times, identified by name. For example, in 
1889, Thomas G. Shearman published an article titled The 
Owners of the United States.83 The article was one of the earliest 
 
 78 PAUL FRENTROP, A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 1602–2002, at 192–94 
(2002); Navin & Sears, supra note 65; Cheffins, supra note 75, at 6–10. 
 79 Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 524. 
 80 For a description of the U.S. horizontal consolidation movement at the end of the 
nineteenth century see, e.g., FRENTROP, supra note 78, at 192–94; Navin & Sears, supra 
note 65; Cheffins, supra note 75, at 12 (“One key constituency which remained when a 
turn-of-the-century merger had been concluded was composed of the owners of the 
formerly autonomous firms encompassed within the consolidation. This was because of 
the merger package typically offered to incumbents with an industry.”).  
 81 FRENTROP, supra note 78, at 193. 
 82 Cheffins, supra note 75, at 10–11. 
 83 Thomas G. Shearman, The Owners of the United States, 8 FORUM 262 (1898). 
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attempts to measure income distribution within the United 
States. Shearman found that “40,000 persons own[ed] over one 
half of the wealth of the United States, while one seventieth part 
of the people own[ed] over two thirds of the wealth.”84 Even more 
significant was Shearman’s conclusion that while the top echelon 
of wealthy Americans greatly benefited from the indirect effects 
of taxation, they carried little of the tax burden.85 Shearman’s 
article turned out to be highly influential.86 
Shearman supported his conclusions not by numbers alone, 
but also, for lack of a better description, by “name calling.” 
Shearman identified by name many of the wealthiest Americans 
avoiding the tax burden, putting faces on the abstract notion of 
“rich Americans.” He spelled out names such as Astor, 
Vanderbilt, Rockefeller, and many more as specific examples.87 
“Name calling” was common in floor debates, both in the context 
of the 1894 Act and of the 1909 Act. Wealth distribution played a 
major role in these debates, and elected officials frequently 
named the intended targets of corporate taxes.88 These wealthy 
individuals were understood to be the intended target of the Acts. 
Significantly, these identified individuals held most of their 
wealth in corporations incorporated in the United States. These 
corporations, in turn, earned much (if not all) of their income 
from U.S. operations.89 Standard Oil and the American Sugar 
 
 84 Id. at 271. 
 85 Id. at 272. 
 86 Shearman was invited to testify at the Ways and Means tax subcommittee when 
potential changes to tax law had begun to be discussed in 1893. STEVEN S. WEISMAN, THE 
GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN TO WILSON–THE FIERCE BATTLES OVER MONEY AND POWER 
THAT TRANSFORMED THE NATION 124 (2002).  
 87 Shearman, supra note 83, at 265.  
 88 In the context of the 1894 Act, see, e.g., WEISMAN, supra note 86, at 137 (referring 
to Benton McMillin, the chairman of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Taxation and 
one of the original drafters of the 1894 bill, who argued that empires fell due to wealth 
concentration, noting that “the Emperor of Russia, the Sultan of Turkey, the Emperor of 
Austria, the Emperor of Germany, the King of Italy, Queen Victoria and others 
who . . . were worth less than the Rothschilds, Rockefellers, Vanderbilts and others in the 
United States”); see id. at 144 (noting that Senator William Allen of Nebraska, who “[i]n 
defending the tax . . . asserted that 9 percent of the families in America owned 71 percent 
of the wealth. In New York alone, he declared . . . there were 119 millionaires! He rattled 
off their names: Vanderbilt, Whitney, Rockefeller and so on . . . .”). In the context of the 
1909 Act, see id. at 219 (quoting Representative Cordell Hull as complaining about the 
“‘infamous system of class legislation’ that burdened the average person while ‘virtually 
exempting the Carnegies, the Vanderbilts, the Morgans, and the Rockefellers, with their 
aggregated billions of hoarded wealth’”).  
 89 The source of wealth of these corporations has also been part of the political 
debate. Corporations were regarded as a “class of our citizens who own and control a very 
large and increasing part of the property of the country; who enjoy certain public 
franchises of very substantial character.” STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE 
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Refinery Company, the intended targets of the 1898 Act,90 were 
both perfect examples. Standard Oil was incorporated by John 
Davison Rockefeller in 1870 in Ohio.91 The American Sugar 
Refining Company, substantially owned and managed by Henry 
Osborne Havemeyer, was incorporated in 1891 in New Jersey.92 
Other examples of companies owned or managed by individuals 
who were identified in tax reform debate included the 
Vanderbilts’ railroad empire, which was composed of several 
state-chartered corporations incorporated during the nineteenth 
century,93 as was the Goulds’ railroad conglomerate.94 The Astors’ 
fur trading empire was operated, among others, via the American 
Fur Company, incorporated in New York in 1808.95 
To summarize, from a jurisdictional point of view, it does not 
matter if one prefers the regulatory argument or wealth 
distribution argument to explain the corporate tax acts of the 
late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries in the United 
States. The intended targets of the corporate tax acts were 
named. These individuals held their fortune by virtue of their 
ownership or control of corporations that were incorporated and 
operated in the United States. Under such circumstances, the 
POI model effectively operated to tax income earned by such 
individuals from their U.S.-based operations.  
C. The Modern Failure of the Positive Function in the United 
States 
Thus far I have shown that in the historical context 
surrounding the adoption of corporate taxation in the United 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 46–47 (2010) (citing 
William L. Wilson, The Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. L. REV. 1). 
 90 See supra text accompanying notes 44–47. 
 91 7 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 520–21 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 3d ed. 2003).  
 92 See WM. SULZER, AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING COMPANY 9 (1904), available at 
http://ia700409.us.archive.org/27/items/cu31924103062851/cu31924103062851.pdf.  
 93 For example, Vanderbilt is well known for his involvement within the New York & 
Erie Railroad. See EDWARD J. RENEHAN JR., COMMODORE: THE LIFE OF CORNELIUS 
VANDERBILT 243 (2007). The New York & Erie Railroad was incorporated under a state 
act of New York. See Erie Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 88 U.S. 492, 493 (“The Erie Railroad 
Company was chartered by an act of the legislature of the State of New York, April 24th, 
1832, with power to construct a railroad from the city of New York to Lake Erie, through 
the southern tier of counties of the State of New York.”).  
 94 For example, in 1860 Jay Gould purchased the controlling interest in the 
Rutland & Washington Railroad Company and became its president. See 7 THE NATIONAL 
CYCLOPÆDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, JAMES T. WHITE COMPANY 218 (1899). The 
Rutland & Washington Railroad Company was chartered under an act of the state of 
Vermont in 1847. See 1 THE RAILROAD LAWS AND CHARTERS OF THE UNITED STATES 844 
(W.P. Gregg & Benjamin Pond eds., 1851).  
 95 STATE OF N.Y., AN ACT TO INCORPORATE THE AMERICAN FUR COMPANY, ch. CXL 
(1835) (passed April 6, 1808). 
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States, the POI test for tax-residence determination operated as 
a source-based tax instrument. This is a functional rather than a 
historical argument. Namely, I do not suggest that the original 
drafters of U.S. corporate tax law have purposely so designed the 
tax-residence test. This would necessitate full-blown historical 
research, well beyond the scope of a symposium piece. However, 
the functional argument demonstrates that the adopted 
residence test (POI) supported source taxation, and that in turn, 
source-based taxation supported the historical purposes for 
which the United States adopted corporate taxes. 
The consideration of current territorial reform proposals 
thus begs two questions: First, will a POI test support source 
taxation under current economic conditions? Namely, if a 
corporation is incorporated in the United States, does POI 
positively point to the United States as the source of income (and 
if a corporation is incorporated elsewhere, does this suggest that 
the source of income is not the United States)? Second, if the 
answer is in the negative, is there any other corporate 
tax-residence test that might positively point to the source of 
income earned and distributed by a corporation? 
It is clear that the answer to the first question is in the 
negative. Today, unlike the early twentieth century, the United 
States takes a leading role in the global economy.96 
U.S.-incorporated corporations can freely operate around the 
world and earn foreign-source income. The assumption that such 
corporations accumulate all of their wealth from domestic 
operations is no longer viable. Conversely, there is ample 
evidence that U.S.-incorporated corporations accumulate most of 
their profits not directly, but in affiliates incorporated in 
low-to-no tax jurisdictions (where no economic activity takes 
place).97 It is easy and practically costless to incorporate a 
subsidiary in a tax haven, thereby avoiding U.S. taxing 
jurisdiction altogether. Meaning, foreign incorporation does not 
mean that income is not sourced to the United States. POI is 
dysfunctional to the extent we expect it to point to the source of 
income. 
 
 96 As of December 2013, “[t]he United States is the largest investor abroad and the 
largest recipient of direct investment in the world.” JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS21118, U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD: TRENDS AND CURRENT ISSUES (2013). 
 97 See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40178, 
TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(2011); see also STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON 
HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., REP. ON REPATRIATING 
OFFSHORE FUNDS: 2004 TAX WINDFALL FOR SELECT MULTINATIONALS (Comm. Print 2011). 
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Answering the second question—whether any tax-residence 
test other than POI can positively point to the source of income of 
a corporation—is more complex. The United States’s formal POI 
test is frequently contrasted with more substantive corporate 
tax-residence tests used by other jurisdictions. Substantive tests 
inquire into various “connecting factors” that define “the link 
between a company and the national territory of the State who 
wants to exercise its jurisdiction to tax that company . . . .”98 
Such tests may include, among others, the central management 
and control (CMC) test;99 the place of effective management 
(POEM);100 the place where main economic activity is carried 
on;101 or the place of residence of shareholders.102 An argument 
can be made that a substantive residence test can theoretically 
point to the source of income. The logic is that substantive tests 
point to the jurisdiction of the corporation’s real economic 
attributes, where income is presumably generated. 
 
 98 See Peter Behrens, General Principles of Residence of Companies, in RESIDENCE 
OF COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 3, 26–27; see also Pasquale Pistone, EC Law and Tax 
Residence of Companies, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 183, 184–85. 
 99 The CMC test is used by all commonwealth jurisdictions, and widely adopted 
throughout the world. Under this test, “a company resides for purposes of income tax 
where its real business is carried on[,] . . . and the real business is carried on where the 
central management and control actually abides.” De Beers Consolidated Mines, 
Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] 5 A.C. 455 (H.L.) 458. For an excellent discussion on the adoption of 
the managed and controlled tests by Commonwealth jurisdictions, see ROBERT COUZIN, 
CORPORATE RESIDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 22 (2002); see also 
AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 435 (noting that Commonwealth jurisdictions 
traditionally adhered to the CMC test). 
 100 This test is adopted by most civil law jurisdictions, and is the test prescribed by 
the OECD model, which it defines as “the place where key management and commercial 
decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in 
substance made.” OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON 
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 77 (2008). In most cases POEM is one and 
the same as CMC. See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, INTM120210–COMPANY 
RESIDENCE: GUIDANCE ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE INTERNATIONAL TAX HANDBOOK, at 
ITH348 (2010), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/intm1202 
10.htm#IDA1ORZF (explaining the apparent differences between CMC and POEM and 
concluding that “it is not that easy to divorce effective management from central 
management and control and in the vast majority of cases they will be located in the same 
place”). For a description of different factual tests adopted by civil law jurisdictions, see 
Luc De Broe, Corporate Tax Residence in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in RESIDENCE OF 
COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 95. 
 101 In Italy, a corporation will be considered “domestic” for tax purposes if, among  
satisfaction of other criteria, its main business purpose is in Italy for the greater part of 
the financial year. See, e.g., CARLO GALLI, INT’L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, 
CORPORATE TAXATION—ITALY 26 (2013). 
 102 Countries using some variation of the residence-of-shareholders test include, for 
example, Australia and Italy. See Michael Dirkis, Australia, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES, 
supra note 24, at 311, 324–29 (discussing the ownership-presumption model adopted in 
Australia); see also Mario Tenore, Italy, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES, supra note 24, at 
519, 540–44 (discussing the ownership-presumption model adopted by Italy).  
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Unfortunately, due to the nature of income and operations of 
multinational corporations, this argument is unconvincing. A 
single corporation can operate in multiple jurisdictions. Multiple 
different activities (such as research, manufacturing, 
advisement, sales, and so on) can each take place in a different 
jurisdiction (or each in multiple jurisdictions), notwithstanding 
all are aimed at generating the same stream of income. Under 
such circumstances, few streams of income can be said to have 
identifiable sources, and therefore no residence test can be said 
to point to the source of the income of a corporation. The 
production of income is no longer bound by physical proximities 
that converge around a single factor (or even around multiple 
factors with clear locational attributes). In short, “[t]here is no 
unifying normative concept that justifies treating income as 
derived in one jurisdiction rather than another.”103  
This does not mean that corporate tax-residence has no 
function in supporting source-based taxation. To the contrary, 
tax-residence still plays a major part in sourcing income, but we 
must rethink the instrumentality of residence determination in 
such context. I address this issue in the next Part. 
III. THE “NEGATIVE” FUNCTION OF CORPORATE TAX-RESIDENCE 
A. Corporate Tax-Residence and Income Shifting 
In order to understand what might be the territorial 
instrumentality of corporate tax-residence determination, we 
must make a preliminary assumption, that income indeed has a 
source, or sources (notwithstanding we may have difficulty 
identifying such sources). Once this threshold is cleared, we must 
question what role (if any) corporate tax-residence could play in 
supporting source taxation in an environment where the positive 
identification of sources is almost impossible. 
The positive difficulty with source-based taxation 
materializes in the problem of income shifting. Income shifting is 
a generic name for any technique by which a multinational group 
is able to have income that is economically generated in one 
jurisdiction, reported for tax purposes in another jurisdiction. For 
example, a patent could be completely developed in the labs of a 
corporation residing in a tax jurisdiction. It is very easy, 
 
 103 Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, supra note 3, at 1631; Edward D. 
Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 143 (2011) (“[T]he global 
tax norms that define the geographic source of income or expense are largely artificial 
constructs, difficult to administer and often devoid of any conceptual foundation.”) 
[hereinafter Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income]. 
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however, to have the patent legally owned by an affiliate that 
resides in a tax haven. Thus, all royalties are paid to the tax 
haven corporation where income is booked, notwithstanding that 
all research activity took place in the parent’s jurisdiction, and 
that the affiliate did not meaningfully participate in the activity. 
Professor Edward Kleinbard famously coined the phrase 
“stateless income” to describe the resulting tax consequences. He 
defines stateless income as “the movement of taxable income 
within a multinational group from high-tax to low-tax source 
countries without shifting the location of externally-supplied 
capital or activities involving third parties.”104 
Income shifting techniques have received much attention in 
recent tax reform discourse in the United States105 and are the 
focus of a major project undertaken by the OECD.106 To date, 
most mechanisms that have been put in place to address income 
shifting have, in one way or another, focused on making sure that 
income that is being “shifted” is “resourced” to its “true” origin.107 
For example, intercompany pricing measures focus on making 
sure that intercompany dealings are priced at arm’s-length, so 
profits are not booked with foreign affiliates in tax havens. 
“Anti-stripping” mechanisms are intended to assure that income 
is not “stripped” from the source jurisdiction through deductible 
payments to a foreign affiliate. Controlled Foreign Corporation 
(CFC) regimes make income that is nominally earned by foreign 
affiliates taxed to the parent unless the foreign affiliate is 
substantively engaged in an active trade or business in the 
foreign jurisdiction. 
Importantly for our purposes, any income shifting technique 
depends on the existence of both “domestic” and “foreign” affiliate 
corporations. Corporate tax-residence is thus an integral part to 
any income shifting technique, and as such can be a significant 
instrument in preventing it.  
 
 104 Kleinbard, supra note 1, at 702. 
 105 See Omri Marian, Meaningful Corporate Tax Residence, 140 TAX NOTES 470, 
470−71 (2013).  
 106 For a discussion on the BEPS OECD project, see Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 
FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2408034.  
 107 Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, supra note 103, at 140–51 (discussing 
common anti-income-shifting mechanisms). 
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B. The Negative Function Explained: Formalism as a Proxy for 
Non-Source 
While corporate tax-residence cannot positively point to the 
source of income, it can identify the jurisdictions in which income 
is definitely not generated. Since income shifting heavily depends 
on corporate tax-residence determination, the idea would be to 
design the residence test in a manner that would not allow 
income to be reported in a jurisdiction where a corporation has no 
real economic attributes. I refer to this approach as the “negative 
function” of corporate tax-residence. 
A stylized example will help to demonstrate this “negative 
function.” Assume a world of three jurisdictions: Fredonia, 
Sylvania, and Florin. Both Fredonia and Sylvania are developed, 
high-tax jurisdictions. Florin is a tax haven. The GCH Group is a 
global leader in the designing and manufacturing of widgets. 
GCH’s headquarters as well as its research facilities are found in 
Fredonia, and are operating through a publically traded 
corporation, FredoniaCo. Each widget designed by FredoniaCo is 
IP protected, but the IP is owned by a GCH subsidiary resident 
in Florin, FlorinCo. FlorinCo has no employees. Two other GCH 
subsidiaries, FreCo and SylCo are residents in Fredonia and 
Sylvania, respectively. They both pay FlorinCo royalties for the 
right to manufacture the IP-protected widgets in their respective 
jurisdictions. FreCo and SylCo then sell the widgets in Fredonia 
and Sylvania, respectively, at a substantial markup over the cost 
of production. The deductible royalty to FlorinCo is set to match 
the gain from selling the widgets. In such a manner, all income is 
booked to FlorinCo (i.e., the royalties income), in spite of the fact 
that there is no economic activity in Florin. No income is booked 
to either Sylvania or Fredonia—due to the deductible royalties—
in spite of the fact that both Sylvania and Fredonia are 
jurisdictions where real economic activity takes place. 
Assume that at some point FlorinCo makes payments (for 
example, in the form of dividends) to Sylvania or Fredonia. If 
Fredonia and Sylvania are both territorial jurisdictions, such 
payments will not result in income recognition in those 
jurisdictions, since the payments will be foreign-sourced. That is 
the case because payments of dividends and interest are 
generally sourced to the residence of the payor, which in this case 
is Florin.  
Traditional anti-shifting mechanism will focus the efforts on 
resourcing the income from Florin to Sylvania or Fredonia (for 
example, by adjusting the dollar value of the royalties, thereby 
reducing deductions to FreCo and SylCo). My suggestion would 
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be to support these mechanisms by a residency construct that 
assures that FlorinCo is not considered a resident in Florin, 
where it has no economic attributes. Under such circumstances, 
no income will be sourced to Florin (since FlorinCo will be 
resident in a place other than Florin), and income shifting is 
prevented. 
Importantly, the function of such residence determination is 
strictly negative. It does not positively point to the source of 
income as being in Fredonia or Sylvania, even though these are 
the only two available alternatives if Florin is ruled out. But 
where the “real residence” is, is irrelevant in this context. 
Negative residency construction simply prevents 
“false-residency.” Income will thus be sourced to a jurisdiction 
where some economic attributes exist (regardless if income was 
indeed produced in that jurisdiction), and not where income could 
not have possibly been produced. 
Obviously, the negative function of corporate tax-residence 
demands that tax-residence be determined based on substantive 
connecting factors of the corporation to a jurisdiction. A formal 
residency determination such as POI would make it very easy (as 
is the case today under U.S. law) to incorporate pocketbook 
entities in tax havens, and book income to such entities. In a 
sense, “formal” residency attributes serve as a proxy to 
“non-source.” 
C. The Negative Function in Practice: Formulary 
Apportionment as a Tax-Residence Test 
The last part of the functional puzzle is to determine how to 
construct a substantive corporate tax-residence test that can 
properly function to prevent income shifting. 
It has previously been argued that corporate tax-residence is 
largely elective, in the sense that the taxpayer can arrange their 
affairs in a way that corporations reside for tax purposes in a 
jurisdiction of their choosing.108 As a factual matter such 
argument is probably correct, and presents challenges to the 
functional project. However, arranging residence in one 
jurisdiction rather than another is not costless. Residence 
electivity is a matter of degree.109 This largely solves the problem 
for our purposes. The sole requirement of a “negative” 
tax-residence construction in a territorial system is that it 
 
 108 Shaviro, supra note 12, at 381–85. 
 109 Id. at 384. 
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decreases the electivity of tax-residence of a corporation to an 
extent that a corporation could not be resident where it has no 
(or very little) economic attributes. There is no need to identify 
“real” residency. In other words, the idea would be to increase the 
costs of residence election. 
Increasing the cost of residence electivity means that 
tax-residence of corporations should not be determined by a 
single “substantive” factor (for example, the place of 
management). A single factor test will be rather easy to 
manipulate. For example, many jurisdictions use the place of 
central management and control (CMC) as the tax-residence test 
for corporations. It used to be the case that the place of CMC was 
presumed to be the place where board meetings are held.110 This 
test is easy to manipulate by having the board meetings 
conducted in a tax haven. Effectively, it makes the CMC test a 
formal one. In other words, single factor tests may be too elective. 
Obviously, an alternative would be to use multiplicity of 
factors, such as CMC, the place where the economic activity 
takes place, and so on. The problem with such an approach is 
that it is difficult to administer. In today’s world, a corporation 
may have its management, assets, and operations spread across 
the globe. Deciding a single location for residence under such 
circumstances is administratively challenging (which factors 
should take precedent?) and largely meaningless. 
Nonetheless, our aim is not to “discover” the “true” residency 
of a corporation. It would therefore be satisfactory to combine the 
“multiplicity of factors” approach with an administratively 
feasible approach that is less than accurate. Luckily, such an 
approach has already been suggested and heavily discussed in 
other contexts: the formulary apportionment approach. 
 
 110 In the past, where the board met was seen as the decisive factor for purposes of 
making a determination as to the place of management, as expressed in the previous 
version of the OECD tax-treaty model. See OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 81 (2005) (“The place of effective management 
will ordinarily be the place where the most senior person or group of persons (for example 
a board of directors) makes its decisions, the place where the actions to be taken by the 
entity as a whole are determined.”). However, in July of 2008, the OECD neglected the 
“place of board meeting” presumption, and adopted a much more nuanced (and less clear) 
test to determine the place of management: the decision is based on “facts and 
circumstances.” See OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON 
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 77 (2008) (“All relevant facts and circumstances must be 
examined to determine the place of effective management.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466082
Do Not Delete 9/27/2014 10:12 PM 
182 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
Formulary apportionment has been proposed as an 
alternative to the territorial versus global taxation debate.111 
Specifically, formulary apportionment is a method used to 
allocate taxing jurisdiction from multijurisdictional activity by 
taking into account the relative weights (therefore “formulary”) 
of various economic attributes such as payroll, assets, and sales 
in various jurisdictions. “Under a formulary profit split, tax 
liabilities would reflect the economic reality of globally integrated 
businesses, and they would not vary among businesses based on 
their relative abilities to shift the ownership of intangible 
property.”112  
The formulary apportionment approach is by no means 
uncontested.113 Many doubt that such an approach can be applied 
as a unilateral measure, question which economic “attributes” 
should be taken into account in the formula, and doubt the extent 
to which such attributes are immune to taxpayers’ manipulation. 
But for our purpose, it does not really matter. We do not seek a 
“correct” result. All we need it to determine is that a corporation 
is not resident somewhere. 
If a formula that takes into account number of employees, 
tangible assets, and sales figures is used to determine the 
residency of a corporation, a corporation will have very little 
chance to end up a resident in a jurisdiction where it has no 
economic activity. Of course, in order to make sense, the formula 
must not be calculated on a per-corporation basis. In such a case, 
a single employee in a small office may constitute all of the 
economic attributes of a corporation incorporated in a tax haven, 
which would defeat the purposes of the test. Rather, the 
measurement must be proportional to the entire control group. 
For example, a corporation would not be able to claim residency 
in a jurisdiction unless it meets certain formulary thresholds in 
that jurisdiction, compared to the group’s aggregate attributes. 
It is likely that a corporation will end up a resident in a 
jurisdiction where it has some real infrastructure, which in turn 
implies that the jurisdiction is not a tax haven. As such, there is 
 
 111 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating 
Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. 
TAX REV. 498 (2009).  
 112 Id. at 507. 
 113 For more skeptical views of formulary apportionment see, e.g., Julie Roin, Can the 
Income Tax be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary 
Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169 (2008), and see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. 
Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary Apportionment in the U.S. International Income 
Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014). 
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no “foreign corporation” resident in a tax haven, to which income 
can be shifted.  
CONCLUSION 
Corporate tax-residence plays an important role in territorial 
tax systems. Poorly constructed corporate tax-residence tests 
may be detrimental to source taxation. Conversely, properly 
constructed corporate tax-residence models can support source 
taxation by preventing income shifting. In turn, this purpose can 
be achieved by increasing the cost of electing tax-residence that 
is detached from real economic considerations. I have suggested 
one way to do so—formulary apportionment—but other 
cost-increasing mechanisms may achieve similar results. Of 
course, the nuts and bolts of each residence reform will have to 
be worked out, a task well beyond the scope of a symposium 
piece. 
Increasing the cost of residence electivity may draw critique, 
as it may make the U.S. tax system less competitive. To the 
extent one truly believes in territorial taxation, such critique 
cannot stand. If an instrument is designed to support taxation of 
income in its true source, it makes little sense to argue against it. 
It makes little sense to support source taxation as an ideological 
matter and at the same time advocate competitiveness by 
allowing taxpayers to strip income away from the jurisdiction of 
source. Competitiveness must be addressed by other means, such 
as reducing corporate tax rates. 
Recent international tax reform proposals in the United 
States seem to embrace the idea of territorial taxation. 
Unfortunately, such proposals, in their focus on source taxation, 
largely lose sight of the relevance of tax-residence determination 
to territorial taxation. Residence determination plays an 
important role in sourcing income, and is the linchpin for 
income-shifting mechanisms that operate against source-based 
taxation. This conclusion is particularly important to the United 
States, where the cost of tax-residence electivity is practically 
zero. It is therefore prudent, if not necessary, that any territorial 
reform proposal in the United States considers the tax-residence 
of corporations. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466082
Do Not Delete 9/27/2014 10:12 PM 
184 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466082
